Objectives: to describe a comprehensive analytical framework for assessing health sector reforms and demonstrates use of the analysis framework using cost-recovery mechanisms as a case study in the wHo african region. Data sources: Health sector reforms published literature review. Study selection: No selection involved. Data extraction: this paper draws from previous published literature to describe a comprehensive framework to assess the performance of health sector reforms in the african region. Using this framework, it goes on to illustrate how it may be used to analyze cost recovery reforms as a case study. the major elements for the analysis include a description of the context, design, process and intended results. Data synthesis: in terms of context and design of the cost recovery reform, there were gaps in the stewardship role of governments as evidenced by the lack of appropriate policies and information to monitor and/or influence the process. Regarding the cost recovery implementation, it is not clear from the literature reviewed in this paper that there was a comprehensive stakeholder coordination mechanism that catered for all who were involved. Concerning results of the expected results of implementing cost recovery reforms such as improved quality of health services; equitable service utilisation; social sustainability through active community participation; and gains in efficiency were not always realised. Conclusions: Given that the aspects of the analysis framework described in this paper are interrelated, reviewing one without another provides an answer to a specific question but is insufficient for a comprehensive assessment.
over the last two decades, most african countries have implemented various health sector reforms to address gaps in access, equity, quality, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of health systems(1). concurrently, several other global initiatives (such as the Millennium development Goals; declaration of the World summit on children; Health for all in the 2st century; and new Partnership for the african development) that promise an increased leverage for improvements in population health were adopted.
Health sector reforms (Hsr) can be described as sustained, purposeful and fundamental changes intended to improve the performance of the sector in terms of efficiency, equity and effectiveness (2) . implementation of Hsr in the region has not always been in response to identified gaps within the sector. some health sector reforms have been imposed as part of broader economic reform s26 policy. the main reforms in the past two decades have included decentralisation of health services management and operation to sub-national levels; health fi nancing initiatives such as user fees in the public sector, community co-management and cofi nancing mechanisms centred on essential drugs (Bamako initiative); organization of health services including autonomy of management to hospitals and promotion of public/private partnerships. More recently, some countries have considered the introduction of social health insurance (, 3) .
Monitoring and evaluation of health sector reforms are critical for identifying whether they have met or are likely to meet their primary aims. they also provide feed-back to countries and development partners so that changes can be made if strategies do not appear to be working or simply need fi ne-tuning (4).There have been various efforts to assess the impact of implementing Hsr in the region (-5), each of these lay emphasis on some and not all aspects needed to provide a comprehensive analysis. this paper therefore draws from previous published literature to describe a comprehensive framework to assess the performance of reforms in the african region. using this framework, it goes on to illustrate how it may be used to analyze cost recovery reforms as a case study.
MatErials aNd MEtHods
Conceptual framework: the major elements for analysis of a health sector reform include a description of the context, design, process and intended results (). figure lays out a conceptual framework for this analysis.
Context for health sector reform: Health sector reform does not take place in a vacuum and therefore analysis of the context should provide clear and detailed descriptions of the key factors driving the reform. the context of the reform will be closely related to why it was placed on the agenda. the context will therefore be related to whether it is in response to an external factor such as broader macroeconomic reforms or purposefully created to address an issue within the health sector such as the need to scale up access to new technologies/medicines. The analysis in this case identifi es the impetus for the reform.
Health sector reform design: the design of a health sector reform takes into consideration what mechanisms will be manipulated to effect the desired change; which key stakeholders will be involved at the various stages; and their various interests, mandates and the potential to (re) -direct s27 implementation of the reform. it also considers whether the reform is appropriate to address the identified health issues. Analysis of this level needs a careful review of each of these areas and how they were executed. The evaluative questions that may be asked for the context and design of a reform are included in table .
Health sector reform implementation: analysis of the implementation stage reviews the actual level of inputs and compliance with agreed upon activities. Inputs to be reviewed will include finances, human resource time and skills, and other logistics. the activities to be reviewed relate to the organization of inputs in relation to implementation of the reform. Inputs will not always be quantitative and could relate to a process that requires a qualitative assessment. Table 2 includes the evaluative questions related to the assessment of a health sector reform.
Health sector reform results: a review of the results achieved is carried out at the level of outputs, outcomes and impact. the review should also identify external factors such as parallel implementation of reforms and unmet assumptions that could have positively or negatively influenced reform implementation. reviewing the results will also enable one to determine if the health sector objectives have been met. 
rEsUlts
Monitoring and evaluation of health financing reforms: a case study for cost recovery mechanisms: the assessment of cost recovery reforms uses information from published papers on both user fees and the Bamako initiative. the limitation of this data source is that it does not include all aspects of the described analysis framework. More appropriate data sources for a comprehensive assessment are provided in tables -4.
The context and design for cost recovery reforms: the impetus for cost recovery reforms was on the one hand in response to broader health financing reforms. on the other hand, it was also promoted as a means to address chronic shortages of essential supplies in the health sector. thus the deteriorating public health care and the pressure to comply with broader macro-economic reforms created a conducive environment for the adoption of cost recovery mechanisms. Multilateral agencies were major stakeholders in the launching and promotion of the Bamako initiative. Both WHo and unicEf promoted the initiative as a strategy to reduce infant and child mortality mainly through improving and ensuring the availability of essential medicines and supplies (6) (7) (8) . The agenda of the World Bank was mainly economic, believing that such a measure would obviate the need for poor governments to finance all health care as well as improving efficiency.
In the adoption of the initiative in 1988, it is apparent that the governments of these poor countries bought into the multilateral agencies' agenda. a 
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later endorsement by african health ministers and other senior officials additionally recognised quality improvement in service provision as a rationale for charging patients. in spite of commitment at such a high level, there were gaps in the stewardship role of governments as evidenced by the lack of appropriate policies and information to monitor and/or influence the process (6, 9) . Given that communities were already paying for health care use, resistance towards cost recovery initiatives was not anticipated (6, 9) . This assumption probably did not take into consideration the 5-30% • Proportion of infrastructure and equipment budget that is funded using finances from cost recovery schemes
• demonstrates capacity to finance large capital items
• income and expenditure records • Budgets and work-plans note; the denominator for each of these indicators will depend of the factor being assessed e.g. Number of positions filled in accordance with staffing norms: in this case the denominator will be either the total positions available for all cadres or the total for a selected cadre; the numerator in this case will be the actual positions filled. of the sub-saharan population that is unable to afford payment for health care (7) . it is therefore not surprising that objection by the poor to cost recovery led to abolition of user fees in 2003 in the Uganda public sector (10) . the focus of the cost recovery mechanisms on patient as opposed to provider behaviour () could have contributed to the flaunting of the rules through the emergence of under the table fees to compensate health workers who were losing out in the implementation of the initiative (9). The higher price structure for some services led intended beneficiaries to opt for private health services, making the latter important stakeholders (2).
Health sector reform implementation: it is not clear from the literature reviewed in this paper that there was a comprehensive stakeholder coordination mechanism that catered for all who were involved. there was though a public participation mechanism through health committees. communities as the intended direct beneficiaries had management structures that potentially created avenues for an oversight function in terms of implementation of the initiative. for instance, health committees representing communities were said to be able to hold monitoring sessions in which coverage targets, inputs and expenditures were set, reviewed and analysed and compared (8) . These committee members in some cases as in Niger had conflicting interests in the management of the scheme and no clear mandates and legal positions. also in reality, the district health teams often filled in for community members, in essence creating a lack of ownership of the scheme at this level (2) . so one might say that the public participation mechanism were not fully functional. this also means that the opportunity to support social sustainability of the reform was not fully exploited.
at the implementation level, the inputs in terms of financial and human resources needed to support cost recovery schemes were largely underestimated. additionally, although there was often clear consensus on the process and level of activities, this was not always complied with especially at the operational level. some assumptions on key processes were made that were either insufficient or not implemented. for instance it was assumed that coordinating prices across levels of care would strengthen appropriate referral. This was insufficient to improve the referral network as clients continued to bypass lower level facilities. it was also assumed that exemption from payment would encourage use of services such as antenatal care and treatment for tuberculosis; there was little evidence to suggest that this had happened. for the assumption that providers would be encouraged to improve quality of care as well as limiting over-prescription, the reverse actually occurred (6) .
there are several examples that point to the shortfalls of human resource inputs. the decline in support supervision of the cost recovery scheme was related to the lack of capacity and insufficient motivation and in Niger contributed to financial mismanagement (2) . in Burkina faso, there was lack of accountability resulting from poor financial record maintenance showing profit and loss for the essential medicines depots (7) .
other input shortfalls were for medicines and supplies. Meuwissen (2) notes that in even apparently well-designed schemes such as the one in niger, stock outs of essential medicines with the permitted wholesalers implied an absence of supplies at the operational level.
disCUssioN
the results that were expected included: an increase in cost recovery that would then be channeled to improve the quality of services; equitable service utilisation in favour of the poor; social sustainability through active community participation (7, 2) ; gains in efficiency would be partly through the reduction in unnecessary use of services (3) .
there was failure to attain these results due to partly weaknesses at the design stage. although the multilateral agencies had a noble and clear agenda and governments committed at the highest level, their mandates fell short of influencing correct implementation at the district and community level.
involvement of external partners in pilot studies yielded expected results but this was not replicated globally in the absence of such support. for instance in cameroon and niger where specialised technical assistance and considerable external funding was provided, it was possible to demonstrate a positive impact on service utilisation in favour of the poor who were the intended beneficiaries. in both settings, quality of care and appropriate targeting of the poor were met (4). s32 in other countries including Ghana, Kenya, lesotho, uganda, Zambia and niger, the introduction of user fees actually contributed to reduction in service utilisation (2, 3, 5) and minimally to cost recovery (6, 16) . A similar finding is reported in nigeria where the introduction of the Bamako initiative actually favoured the least poor (6, 9) .
in swaziland, up to one third of drop in attendance attributed to the poorest (7) . in lesotho the decrease in utilisation occurred mostly in remote areas with difficult terrain and also for children less than five years who are the most vulnerable (6) . The way in which it was implemented in some cases contributed to inequity e.g. in Kenya where it was permitted to collect, retain and use fees at point of collection, provinces with hospitals able to collect more than those without, owing to the absence of a mechanism to redistribute resources from better off areas (6) .
CoNClUsioN
the published papers reviewed in this report answer some but not all the questions described in the analysis framework. a comprehensive analysis is not always required or feasible for assessing a reform. However the aspects described in this paper are interrelated and whilst reviewing one without another provides an answer to a specific question it is insufficient for a comprehensive assessment.
